


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MOBILIZATION TRAINING UNIT (F1-1) (MARINE CORPS) JAC--ETC F/G 15/3
THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS IN THE NATIONAL--ETC(U)
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STAFF STUDY

THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS
IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRUCTURE

MARCH, 1982

Prepared by:

Mobilization Training Unit (MTU Fl-1)

Jacksonville, Florida

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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND:

Mobilization Training Unit F1-1 (MTU F1-1) was tasked by Headquarters Marine Corps through the operational sponsorship of the Development Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) to determine the cost effectiveness of the U.S. Marine Corps in the national defense structure. This study may be used as input into the development center's established five-year plan.

In prosecuting this study, a plan was prepared listing the tasks to be accomplished. Specific dates for the accomplishment of each task were also established. A literature search, including a computer scan at DTIC; a visit to Headquarters, Marine Corps; records check at the library, educational center, MCDEC; along with various manuals and publications published by the Department of Defense and other service components were utilized as resource materials in the production of this study.

B. SCOPE:

The scope of this study is to provide broad coverage on the cost effectiveness of the Marine Corps in the national defense structure by identifying and comparing net benefits associated with alternatives for achieving the same defined goals.

This study will also give a projection of costs of the Marine Corps in the mid-range period based on possible deployments to meet anticipated threats and other potential commitments, i.e., RDJTF.

C. STUDY ORGANIZATION:

The study was performed by Mobilization Training Unit F1-1 (MTU F1-1) organized in the following manner:

1. Project Manager: (MTU Commander) Has overall responsibility for the project to include the following: Coordinator/Status Reports/Resources/Procurement/Assignment of General and Specific Tasks/Liasion with MCDEC.

2. STUDY GROUP I: Has responsibility for quality control/format/bibliographies/methodologies/introduction/background/proof-reading/reproduction.

3. STUDY GROUP II: Has responsibility for production/measure of effectiveness (MOE's)/cost effectiveness analysis of each component/study organization.

Study steering and advice was provided by CDSA Branch, Development Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC).

D. GENERAL METHODOLOGY:

The basic methodology employed in this study is straightforward and consists of the familiar activities of data collection, analysis and synthesis where actual data was not readily accessible. An averaging method was utilized using available data to provide a base for projecting missing data.

SECTION II: ENVIRONMENT:

A. ERA CONCEPT:

This study will use the ERA concept (i.e. pre,post and conflict years) to indicate budget averages of the various armed forces

components from 1940 to 1970 as a means of showing historical trends in defense budgeting. The ERA's used are:

1. Pre WW II (1940)
2. WW II (1941-1945)
3. Post WW II/Pre-Korean (1946-1949)
4. Korean (1950-1954)
5. Inter-Conflict Era (1955-1964)
6. Viet-Nam (1965-1970)
7. Post Viet-Nam (1971-1980)

These eras, as depicted in the appendices, graphically illustrate the rise and decline of Department of Defense budgeting during peacetime and conflict. These trends will be used in conjunction with such other factors as political, social and economic changes to project Marine Corps funding through the mid-range period.

B. THREATS OF THE EIGHTIES AND THE MARINE CORPS ROLE:

The most probable threat to the United States and its' allies during the 1980's will be a Soviet/styled enemy. The type threats can be summarized under three (3) general categories:

1. The Soviet/Warsaw Pact
2. The Soviet Surrogate Forces/Non-Warsaw
3. The Soviet Third World Forces

Specifically, the activities of the Vietnamese in Southeast Asia; the Soviet presence in Southwest Asia; the Cuban activities in Cuba, Africa, Latin America, Central America and in the Caribbean; and the North Korean involvement in Northeast Asia, are of great concern to the United States and will be during the mid-range period.

The Middle East situation has been a hotbed of activity and could develop at any time into a conflict of a large magnitude. This threat environment will probably exist throughout most of the 1980's

and maybe beyond. The United States must be prepared to protect American interest in this region and react rapidly to any situation.

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Forces (RDJTF) could be the answer to the military organization needed to rapidly respond to any threat. The Marine Corps' role as a part of the RDJTF could be expanded so that it becomes the nucleus of the force. The task organization of the Marine Corps Air/Ground Team certainly lends itself to missions requiring a rapidly deploying unit.

In any conflict during the 1980's, it can be anticipated that United States forces will face a well-organized and equipped enemy with advanced technology. This has been evidenced recently by the employment of sophisticated weaponry by Soviet Surrogate Forces during the 3-day war and the direct Soviet intervention into Afghanistan. Based on the possible threats that the United States will face in the 1980's, the Congressional Budget Office has examined the Marine Corps' current mission structure, equipment spending plans and has analyzed 4 approaches that the Marine Corps can take to combat the threats facing the United States in the 1980's.

FIRST: The 1st concerns the path now being followed by the Defense Department in which there are no significant changes and the current budget request for strategy, structure, acquisition or systems development beyond the effect of the Rapid Deployment Force.

SECOND: The 2nd option envisions reinforcement of Norway and Denmark in a crisis that would precede a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. Such a significant shift away from the Marines' general purpose role would mean conversion of nearly two divisions and air

wings into a force concentrated on land warfare in Northern Europe. Equipment for one brigade, including cold weather gear, would be pre-stocked in Norway, with the equipment for 4 others in Denmark.

THIRD: The 3rd alternative would make the Marine Corps the chief participant in the Rapid Deployment Force for 3rd World Missions. It differs from current Defense Department planning in that the Marine Corps would be equipped solely for Middle Eastern combat. This option reflects the view that NATO allies should take a greater share of defending their own territory. It might also bring on the dedication of some Army units to NATO's northern flank.

A requirement emerging from this approach would be more amphibious lift, generating constant deployment of a small Marine amphibious brigade in the Indian Ocean and intermittent deployment in the Pacific, as well as the current presence in the Mediterranean.

Coupled with the Diego Garcia pre-positioning, the increase in lift would permit nearly 2 Marine divisions to land anywhere on the Arabian Sea within 2 weeks of the order to deploy.

Once on land, the Marines would need more light armored vehicles, as well as the air cushioned/assault landing craft (LCAC), which would carry at least 3 of them for up to 200 miles at speeds over 40 knots.

FOURTH: The final option concerns rapid response to a mixed crisis demanding both land and amphibious capabilities. It would resemble the 2nd and 3rd approaches in dedicating much of the Marine Corps to specific missions while preserving one division for a wide variety of tasks.

SECTION III: ANALYSIS:

A. FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

1. The U.S. Coast Guard will not be considered a component branch of the Armed Forces for this study.
2. This study will use the era concept (i.e. pre, post and conflict years) to acquire budget averages of the various armed forces components from 1940 through 1970 to depict historical trends in Department of Defense budgeting.
3. The annual budgets of the various Armed Forces components from 1970 through 1980 will be utilized as a base for projecting Department of Defense budgeting in the Mid-Range Period.
4. Political, social, economic and perceived threat factors influence military budget figures by increasing the figures in times of potential conflict and reducing the figures in times of peace.
5. Budget figures reflect the mission and deployments of the various Armed Forces components.
6. Budget data for the U.S. Air Force and the Department of Defense is not available prior to 1949 since the 1948 budget was finalized at the time of their creation in 1947.
7. Budget figures for the U.S. Marine Corps are extracted from the Secretary of Defense Annual Report (which includes the Secretary of the Navy's Annual Report) and the Department of the Navy Historical Budget Data Pamphlet (January, 1980).
8. The remaining component forces' budget data are extracted from the Annual Statistical Abstract of the United States series.

9. Budget figures are converted to FY-80 dollars based on the U.S. Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual (MCO P7000.14B).

10. The credibility of the study is dependent upon the ability to show the blue/green dollar breakdown as it relates to the Navy budget and to show the percentage of blue dollars that is actually utilized by the U.S. Marine Corps.

11. Due to the inability to obtain complete budgetary information on the blue/green dollar breakdown, this study has taken the two (2) years that were available (1977 and 1978) and used this data as a base to project the remaining yearly percentages.

12. Due to the inability to obtain complete Marine Corps budgetary information, the years that were available (see appendix) were averaged, and the resulting percentage of the Department of Defense budget was applied to the missing yearly data.

B. ASSUMPTIONS:

During the initial phases of this study, (the data gathering stage and the initial planning phase), it became obvious that several assumptions would have to be made if this study were to provide meaningful data. These assumptions are:

1. That component force manning levels will remain relatively constant during the mid-range period.

2. That Department of Defense budget increases will maintain the rate increase indicated by historical trends.

3. That due to the inaccessability of complete Marine Corps budget data, the average Marine Corps percentage of the Department of Defense budget remained at 2.62% (based on available data).

4. That due to the inaccessability of complete blue/green dollar split data, the average Marine Corps percentage increase is .98% of the Department of Defense budget (based on available data).

C. SPECIFIC METHODOLOGY:

This study was initiated by conducting a literature search utilizing the MCDEC Library, DTIC Publications, pertinent manuals furnished by Headquarters Marine Corps, Department of Navy Sources, Department of Army Sources and Public Library information. The data extracted from these sources is included in the appendices.

D. ANALYSIS DISCUSSION:

This study required several diverse sources of information to provide the basic data necessary for the Mid-Range Projection. These areas include military budget data, manpower data, basic mission assignment of each branch of the Department of Defense, and an evaluation of potential threat situations in the Mid-Range Period.

The budget data reveals that the Marine Corps receives the lowest percentage of the Department of Defense budget, and, when graphically depicted, that the Marine Corps budget remains relatively stable, i.e., without the drastic increase/decrease excursions exhibited by other components of the Department of Defense. Interestingly, the rate of increase (based on a 30-year historical study) of Department of Defense component budgets reveals that the Marine Corps has averaged the highest annual percentage increase (at 6.11%) but the disparity between the actual budgets makes this figure relatively insignificant.

The manpower data was utilized to produce a cost-per-man

figure. Since the Marine Corps is the most manpower intensive component of the Department of Defense (70% of Marine Corps budget is used to support manpower activities), this gives the Marine Corps the lowest cost-per-man figure while yielding an operating-to-support ratio of 60:40 - the highest of any component of the Department of Defense. The remaining components utilize a greater portion of their budgets on hardware items, i.e., Air Force (aircraft and missiles), Navy (ships and aircraft) and Army (aircraft and armor), which, by sheer numbers, outweigh the Marine Corps.

A study of the mission assignment of each component of the Department of Defense indicates that there has been little change to their basic mission, however, commitments have been modified to reflect world changes in anticipated threat areas. For the Marine Corps, this has resulted in a commitment to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), a commitment to the NATO Northern Flank and the possibility of a Southwestern Asia Threat. These changes have resulted in more diversified types of training for the Marine Corps, however, the basic mission has remained the same.

SECTION IV: SUMMARY

Supported by the appendices to this staff study (most notably the total budget and the cost-per-man data), it can be seen that the Marine Corps has operated at a lower cost than any other component of the Department of Defense.

SECTION V: CONCLUSION

That, within the parameters of this study and utilizing the 30-year historical data as a base, the Marine Corps will continue

to operate during the Mid-Range Projection Period at the lowest cost of any component of the Department of Defense.

SECTION VI: APPENDICES

1. Military Budget Data
2. Manpower Data
3. Cost-Per-Man Data
4. 30 Year Percentage Rate of Increase/Decrease
(Including 30 year average)
5. ERA Budget Percentage Breakdown
6. Mid-Range Budget Projection
7. Department Of Defense Budget Breakdown In Dollars
(ERA Graphic Depiction)
8. Department Of Defense Budget Breakdown Percentages
(ERA Graphic Depiction)
9. Manpower Data (Graphic Depiction)
10. Cost-Per-Man Data (Graphic Depiction)
11. Bibliography

MILITARY BUDGET DATA
(in millions)

	<u>DOD</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
1940	*	907.2	891.5		*	
1941	*	3,938.9	2,313.1		*	
1942	*	14,325.5	8,579.6		*	
1943	*	42,525.6	20,688.4		*	
1944	*	49,438.3	26,537.6		*	
1945 ^{3,4}	*	50,490.1 284,774.3	30,047.2 169,472.2		*	
1946	*	27,986.8 158,819.5	15,164.4 86,054.9		*	
1947	*	9,172.1 48,205.8	5,597.2 29,417.2		*	
1948	*	7,698.6 38,702.4	4,284.6 21,539.5		*	
1949 ⁴	13,934.6 67,421.8	1,862.4 37,878.7	4,434.7 21,365.0 (19,558.1)	1,146.2 ⁵ 1,806.9	1,690.5 8,144.3	7.0 33.7
1950	13,734.0 61,970.6	4,067.0 18,351.1	4,096.0 18,482.0 (16,895.1)	979.6 ⁶ 1,586.9	3,585.0 16,176.2	1,986.0 8,961.2
1951	21,916.0 91,317.4	7,195.0 29,979.4	5,919.0 24,662.7 (21,375.3)	2,392.5 3,287.4	6,355.0 26,479.4	2,447.0 10,195.9
1952	42,071.0 160,808.0	15,740.0 60,163.0	9,938.0 37,936.0 (32,196.9)	4,213.2 5,789.1	12,743.0 48,707.6	3,650.0 13,951.4
1953	48,576.0 178,303.1	16,605.0 60,950.3	11,640.0 42,725.8 (36,306.3)	4,671.5 6,418.9	15,210.0 55,829.8	5,121.0 19,797.1
1954	44,627.0 165,119.9	12,933.0 47,352.1	11,300.0 42,143.0 (36,198.7)	4,326.1 5,944.3	15,696.0 58,075.2	4,603.0 17,049.6
1955	33,497.0 139,644.0	8,375.0 32,193.2	9,697.0 35,174.9 (30,331.3)	3,474.6 ⁶ 4,843.1	16,335.0 59,434.9	3,540.0 12,841.0

MILITARY BUDGET DATA (II)

	<u>IoT</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
1956	40,305.4 140,688.6	9,274.0 32,371.8	9,744.0 34,012.4 (28,947.6)	3,686.0 5,064.8	16,750.0 58,467.6	4,537.0 15,836.8
1957	58,439.0 127,899.1	9,063.0 30,155.3	10,598.0 34,537.3 (29,993.0)	3,550.9 4,604.3	18,363.0 61,099.2	615.0 2,046.3
1958	53,062.0 122,900.8	9,051.0 28,477.2	10,906.0 34,313.6 (29,899.2)	3,220.0 4,424.4	18,435.0 58,002.0	665.0 2,092.3
1959	41,233.0 125,051.4	9,468.0 28,714.6	11,728.0 35,568.7 (31,066.9)	3,276.4 4,501.8	19,084.0 57,878.0	953.0 2,890.3
1960	41,215.0 123,776.9	9,592.0 28,206.1	11,642.0 34,963.2 (31,279.0)	2,471.2 ⁽⁴⁾ 3,684.2	19,066.0 57,259.0	1,115.0 3,348.6
1961	43,228.0 126,537.0	10,130.0 29,652.5	12,215.0 35,755.8 (31,200.5)	3,315.3 4,555.3	19,778.0 57,894.2	1,105.0 3,234.6
1962	46,815.0 136,175.5	11,427.0 33,233.9	13,260.0 38,570.7 (33,668.4)	3,567.8 4,902.3	20,840.0 60,619.4	1,289.0 3,749.4
1963	46,252.0 139,043.0	11,499.0 33,135.5	14,005.0 40,356.8 (35,351.2)	3,642.9 5,005.6	20,642.0 59,482.0	2,107.0 6,071.5
1964	49,760.0 138,636.3	12,050.0 33,572.5	14,520.0 40,454.2 (35,919.8)	3,175.8 ⁽⁴⁾ 4,534.4	20,509.0 57,140.1	2,661.0 7,469.5
1965	47,093.0 128,893.1	11,552.0 31,614.4	13,339.0 36,504.8 (31,864.6)	3,377.0 4,640.2	18,146.0 49,660.2	4,061.0 11,113.7
1966	55,181.0 142,974.0	14,731.0 38,168.0	15,961.0 41,355.0 (36,207.9)	3,745.9 5,147.1	20,065.0 51,988.4	4,424.0 11,462.6
1967	68,315.0 167,617.7	20,952.0 51,407.8	19,246.0 47,222.0 (41,187.8)	4,391.6 6,034.2	22,918.0 56,231.6	5,199.0 12,756.3
1968	78,027.0 131,802.9	25,223.0 58,729.6	22,071.0 51,425.4 (44,880.5)	4,763.2 6,544.9	25,734.0 59,960.2	4,939.0 11,647.7

MILITARY BUDGET DATA (III)

	<u>DoP</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
1969	78,660.0 176,607.4	25,610.0 57,499.6	22,691.0 50,945.8 (44,587.9)	4,627.1 6,557.9	26,114.0 58,621.2	4,245.0 9,530.9
1970	78,249.0 163,224.5	25,147.0 52,388.7	22,656.0 47,199.2 (39,417.0)	6,182.6 ^(b) 7,782.2	25,223.0 52,567.9	5,312.0 11,068.6
1971	76,005.0 148,625.4	23,909.0 46,756.4	22,374.0 42,754.6 (38,402.7)	5,694.2 5,250.9	24,749.0 48,299.1	4,975.0 9,725.2
1972	76,674.0 138,795.3	23,475.0 42,490.8	22,730.0 41,156.7 (26,160.1)	5,636.4 4,996.6	24,845.0 44,974.4	5,610.0 10,172.3
1973	74,475.0 126,164.7	21,140.0 35,812.3	22,985.0 38,938.9 (24,397.0)	3,305.5 4,541.9	24,538.0 41,569.8	5,811.0 9,844.4
1974	77,651.0 121,229.7	22,371.0 34,934.7	24,616.0 38,462.1 (22,821.6)	5,397.2 ^(b) 4,620.9	25,736.0 40,222.5	4,927.0 7,136.4
1975	84,938.0 140,285.5	22,678.0 32,539.9	28,239.0 40,085.7 (35,167.5)	5,738.4 ^(b) 4,916.2	26,709.0 37,622.2	6,503.0 8,928.2
1976	87,350.0 116,718.4	25,025.0 33,210.7	30,404.0 40,349.2 (25,927.3)	3,268.1 ^(b) 4,411.9	28,248.0 37,487.9	4,272.0 5,669.4
1977 ³	94,810.0 117,877.3	24,231.0 30,126.4	31,287.0 38,899.1 (24,443.3)	5,300.6 ^(b) 4,455.8	28,256.0 35,255.0	10,936.0 13,596.7
1978	102,682.0 119,326.8	26,250.0 30,505.1	33,573.0 39,015.2 (24,504.6)	3,341.2 ^(b) 4,510.6	29,344.0 34,100.7	13,515.0 15,705.8
1979	114,759.0 134,976.8	31,441.0 34,016.0	41,777.0 45,198.5 (40,266.3)	3,509.4 ^(b) 4,822.2	39,914.0 42,182.0	16,626.0 17,987.7
1980	135,500.0	33,161.0	43,303.0 (38,512.1)	4,789.9 ^(b)	38,382.0	20,654.0

MILITARY BUDGET DATA NOTES

1. Figures may not add due to rounding.
2. First line figures are yearly budget data, second line figures are yearly data converted to 1980 dollars (except Navy). Navy figures are Department of Navy totals with third line converted DoN figures minus converted Marine figures.
3. Conversion factors for pre-1945 not available.
4. 1949 first year figures for Air Force and Department of Defense since FY48 budget already finalized at time of their creation in 1947.
5. Marine budget averages 2.62% of DoD budget. Marine portion of Blue/Green dollar split averages .98% of DoD budget for a total Marine average of 3.6% of DoD budget.
6. Figures noted with (6) are actual data for Marine figures while other figures are projected data utilizing 3.6% of DoD budget.
7. FY77 covers period from 1 Jul 76 to 30 Sep 77

MANPOWER DATA

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>
1940	269,023	160,997	28,345	*
1941	1,462,315	234,427	54,359	*
1942	3,075,608	640,570	142,613	*
1943	6,934,472	1,741,750	308,523	*
1944	7,934,750	2,981,365	475,604	*
1945	8,267,958	3,380,817	474,680	*
1946	1,891,011	983,393	155,679	*
1947	991,285	498,661	93,053	*
1948	554,030	419,162	84,988	*
1949	660,473	449,575	85,965	419,347
1950	593,167	381,538	74,279	411,277
1951	1,531,774	736,630	192,620	788,381
1952	1,596,419	824,265	231,967	983,261
1953	1,533,815	794,440	249,219	977,593
1954	1,404,598	725,720	224,000	947,918
1955	1,109,296	660,695	205,170	959,946
1956	1,025,778	669,925	200,780	909,958
1957	997,994	677,108	200,861	919,835
1958	898,925	641,005	189,495	871,156
1959	861,964	626,340	175,571	840,435
1960	873,078	617,984	170,621	814,752
1961	858,622	627,089	176,909	821,151
1962	1,066,404	666,428	190,962	884,025
1963	975,916	664,647	189,633	869,431
1964	972,446	667,163	189,751	855,802

MANPOWER DATA (II)

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>
1965	968,313	671,009	190,187	823,633
1966	1,199,046	744,469	261,687	886,350
1967*	1,454,000	753,000	281,000	899,000
1968	1,520,000	762,000	295,000	887,000
1969	1,512,000	776,000	310,000	862,000
1970	1,322,000	692,000	260,000	791,000
1971	1,124,000	623,000	212,000	755,000
1972	811,000	588,000	198,000	726,000
1973	801,000	564,000	196,000	691,000
1974	783,000	546,000	189,000	644,000
1975	784,000	535,000	196,000	612,000
1976	779,000	524,000	192,000	585,000
1977	782,000	530,000	192,000	570,000
1978	771,000	530,000	191,000	569,000
1979	774,000	524,000	190,000	562,000

*- Figures subsequent to 1966 are rounded to thousands.

COST-PER-MAN DATA

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>
1940	3,572.20			*
1941	26,936.06			*
1942	4,657.78			*
1943	6,079.88			*
1944	6,183.85			*
1945	34,443.12			*
1946	83,986.56			*
1947	48,629.61			*
1948	69,856.14			19,421.39
1949	57,350.87	45,503.53	21,019.02	89,331.64
1950	30,937.49	44,281.57	21,364.05	33,587.06
1951	19,571.69	29,015.72	17,066.76	49,536.80
1952	37,686.22	39,061.35	24,956.57	57,109.45
1953	39,737.52	45,701.25	25,756.06	61,266.06
1954	34,068.18	49,879.71	26,537.05	61,914.84
1955	29,021.29	45,908.93	23,605.30	64,253.08
1956	31,558.29	43,210.21	25,225.62	66,424.09
1957	30,215.31	44,295.74	22,922.82	66,580.50
1958	31,679.17	46,628.65	23,348.37	68,866.72
1959	33,312.99	49,600.70	25,640.91	70,277.83
1960	32,306.51	50,614.58	21,592.89	70,503.72
1961	34,534.99	49,754.50	25,749.40	68,572.04
1962	31,169.14	50,520.69	25,671.60	68,414.86
1963	33,953.23	53,187.93	26,389.29	66,767.90
1964	34,523.80	53,839.62	23,896.58	

COST-PER-MAN DATA (II)

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>
1965	52,648.95	47,487.59	24,398.09	60,294.09
1966	51,831.97	48,635.87	19,668.92	58,654.48
1967*	55,556.12	54,698.27	21,474.02	62,549.05
1968	58,664.21	58,898.29	22,186.10	67,598.87
1969	58,028.84	57,458.63	20,509.35	68,017.63
1970	59,628.57	56,960.98	29,931.54	66,457.52
1971	41,598.22	61,643.18	25,240.09	64,104.77
1972	52,893.09	61,496.77	25,235.35	61,948.21
1973	44,710.74	60,987.59	23,172.96	60,158.90
1974	44,642.02	61,962.64	24,502.21	62,441.77
1975	42,780.48	65,733.64	25,092.86	61,819.12
1976	42,632.48	68,582.63	22,978.65	64,081.88
1977*	58,524.81	64,987.36	23,207.29	61,850.88
1978	59,565.63	65,103.02	23,615.71	59,929.82
1979	45,948.32	77,034.92	25,432.00	76,838.08

*- 1967 and subsequent figures based on manpower data rounded to thousands

*- 1977 covers period 1 Jul 76 to 30 Sep 77

30 YEAR BUDGET PERCENTAGE INCREASE/DECREASE

	<u>DoD</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
1951	47.36	63.37	26.52	107.16	63.69	13.78
1952	76.10	100.68	50.63	76.10	83.94	36.83
1953	10.88	1.31	12.76	10.88	14.62	34.73
1954	-7.39	-21.49	-.30	-7.39	4.02	-9.30
1955	-15.39	-32.72	-16.21	-18.52	2.34	-24.60
1956	.75	.56	-4.56	4.56	-1.63	23.33
1957	-9.09	-6.85	3.61	-5.09	4.50	-67.00
1958	-3.91	-5.56	-.35	-3.91	-5.07	2.25
1959	1.75	.83	3.94	1.75	-.21	30.14
1960	-1.02	-1.77	.60	-10.16	-1.07	15.86
1961	2.23	5.13	-.25	23.64	1.11	-3.40
1962	7.62	12.10	7.91	7.62	4.71	15.92
1963	2.11	-.31	5.00	2.11	-1.80	61.93
1964	-.29	1.32	1.61	-9.41	-3.94	23.03
1965	-7.03	-5.63	-11.29	2.33	-13.09	48.79
1966	10.92	20.73	13.63	10.92	4.69	3.14
1967	17.24	34.69	13.75	17.24	8.16	11.29
1968	8.46	14.32	6.97	8.46	6.63	-0.69
1969	-2.86	-2.16	-.65	-2.86	-2.22	-10.17
1970	-7.56	-6.89	-11.60	22.40	-10.34	16.13
1971	-8.94	-10.75	-2.57	-31.24	-7.93	-12.14
1972	-6.62	-9.12	-5.84	-6.62	-7.06	4.61
1973	-9.10	-15.72	-4.80	-9.10	-7.57	-3.23
1974	-3.83	-2.40	-1.64	1.96	-3.26	-21.80
1975	-.76	-4.05	3.95	6.20	-5.92	15.90

30 YEAR BUDGET PERCENTAGE INCREASE/DECREASE (II)

	<u>DoD</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
1976	-3.05	-.98	2.19	-10.29	-36.50
1977	.99	-9.29	-4.16	1.00	139.63
1978	1.23	1.26	.18	1.23	15.51
1979	13.12	11.51	16.99	7.13	14.53
1980	.39	-2.51	-4.35	-2.86	14.62
30-Year Budget Average	3.61	4.25	3.46	6.11	10.65


ERA BUDGET PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN


	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
POST WWII (1946-1949)	56.18	29.01	2.68	12.08	.05
KOREAN (1950-1954)	55.05	22.65	2.62	31.22	10.49
INTER CONFLICT (1955-1964)	25.46	24.95	2.62	44.48	4.51
VIET-NAM (1965-1970)	30.16	25.96	2.62	34.24	7.03
POST VIET-NAM (1971-1980)	27.71	29.35	2.62	31.37	9.38


MID-RANGE BUDGET PROJECTION*


	<u>DoD</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
1981	140,662.6	34,570.3	39,945.0	4,960.7	40,078.5	22,895.0
1982	146,021.8	36,039.5	41,327.1	5,285.0	41,850.0	25,379.1
1983	151,585.2	37,571.2	42,757.0	5,607.9	43,690.8	28,152.7
1984	157,360.6	39,168.0	44,236.4	5,950.5	45,631.3	31,125.1
1985	163,356.0	40,832.6	45,767.0	6,314.1	47,648.2	34,565.7
1986	169,579.9	42,568.0	47,350.5	6,699.9	49,754.3	38,319.4
1987	176,040.9	44,377.1	48,988.8	7,109.3	51,953.4	42,477.1
1988	182,748.1	46,263.1	50,683.8	7,543.7	54,249.7	47,025.9
1989	189,710.8	48,229.3	52,437.5	8,024.6	56,647.5	52,194.7
1990	196,933.8	50,279.0	54,251.8	8,493.7	59,151.3	57,857.8

*Using 30 Year Average Percentage Increase









Air Force

Marines

Navy

Army

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1. Statistical Abstract of the United States (1979, 1969, 1962, 1961, 1956), National Data Book and Guide to Sources, U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, U. S. Government Printing Office
2. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, U. S. Government Printing Office
3. Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual, MCO P7000.14B
4. Marine Corps Study System, MCO P3902.1
5. United States Army Combat Developments Command, USACDC Pamphlet 471-1, Force Developments, The Measure of Effectiveness
6. Study Plan for Force Structure Analysis
7. Historical Budget Data Pamphlet (Jan. 1980), Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller
8. Economic Analysis Handbook, NAVFAC P-442 (June 1975)
9. An Analysis of U. S. War Costs (DTIC)
10. Army Force Planning Cost Handbook (DTIC)
11. The Relationship Between Inflation and Defense Expenditures (DTIC)
12. Estimation of Military Support Activity Costs (DTIC)
13. Proceedings of the Annual Department of Defense Cost Research Symposium (7th) held in Durham, North Carolina, 12-13 October 1970 (DTIC)
14. Secretary of Defense, Semi-Annual Report, Jan 1 - Jun 30, 1950
15. Secretary of Defense, Semi-Annual Report, Jan 1 - Jun 30, 1955
16. Secretary of Defense Annual Report, 1980 (Harold Brown)

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17. Financial Management in the Navy (Revised 1974), Naval Education and Training Support Command, U. S. Government Printing Office
18. Army Force Planning Cost Handbook, Directorate of Cost Analysis, Office, Comptroller of the Army
19. Army Staff Officers' Field Manual FM101-10-1, Organizational, Technical, and Logistic Data
20. Army Staff Officers' Field Manual FM-101-10-2, Extracts of Non-Divisional TOE

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